Tunisia: The Diplomacy of Dependence

Image source: https://newint.org/features/2023/09/11/kais-saied-tunisia-president

When Kais Saied came to power in 2019, he promised to free the country from foreign influence and corrupt elites and to restore its sovereignty and dignity. Yet his international strategy has been, for the 6 years of his presidency, nothing short of contradictory with his national narrative. Now, and more than ever, Tunisia seems entirely dependent on other actors' financial and political support while trying to manage a severe economic crisis.

From Populist Outsider to Authoritarian President

Before discussing Tunisia’s geopolitical relations, it is relevant to first understand who Kais Saied is and how he managed to seize power.

The rise to power of Kais Saied was born of the Tunisian population's fatigue with the democratic experiment. With no party, no political allies, and no political experience, the former constitutional law professor at the University of Sousse was elected in 2019 with nearly 73% of the vote.1 Most of his political strategy rested on his “integrity” as a “wise” and incorruptible law teacher, and on the rejection many Tunisians felt of the dysfunctional political system that had led to the rise of corruption, ineffectiveness, and party logic.2 The political system inherited from the 2011 revolution became the catalyst for what happened in the years following his election.

The COVID-19 crisis, as well as the parliamentary lock, created a fertile ground for Saied’s authoritarian turn. On the 25th of July 2021, protesters rallied to demand regime change and a response to the ongoing economic crisis, blaming the political parties’ elites for the state of the country. That same night, he invoked Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution, granting himself full powers. He suspended parliament, dismissed his prime minister, and proclaimed a state of exception (État d’exception), allowing him to rule by decree.3

Over the following years, Saied meticulously dismantled every bit of the 2011 revolution’s legacy. The 2022 constitution backed his concentration of powers, dismantled the judicial system, established a presidential regime, and anchored the principles of the “Islamic Oumma” as the end goals of the Tunisian nation.4 He justified such changes by claiming that the country’s sovereignty was stolen by corrupt elites serving foreign interests, when in reality, these changes were meant to mostly annihilate every check and balance.

Despite his claims of restoring the country’s sovereignty, Kais Saied’s international strategy is heavily dependent on a number of actors, which we will take a glimpse of in this article.

From Neighbour to Guarantor: Algeria’s growing role in Tunisia’s security

Algeria has become Saied’s cornerstone on the continent, both politically and economically, and increasingly in security terms.

Since the political crisis of 2021, Algeria has provided Tunisia with energy supplies, diplomatic backing and most importantly, financial assistance. In November 2021, facing the COVID-19 crisis and $41 billion dollars in public debt (85% of GDP), Tunisia contracted a $300m loan from Algiers.5,6 Fast forward to 2023, Tunisia contracted another loan from Algeria, this time for $150 million, positioning Algiers as its most prominent economic partner in the region and providing Saied’s regime with liquidity, allowing him to consolidate his rule while negotiating the terms of a much larger loan from the IMF.

Abdelmadjid Tebboune found in Tunisia the possibility of sustaining a stable and predictable “look-alike” regime that can guarantee stability in the region while serving Algiers political interests, notably regarding the Western Sahara conflict and relations with Europe. Kais Saied’s normative dissidence towards Europe aligns with Algiers' recent positioning, and the elected president's meeting with the Polisario representative, Brahim Ghali, in 2022 has also strengthened Algiers' position against Rabat.7

This systematic alignment between Tunis and Algiers deepened significantly in October 2025 with the defence and national security agreement.8 As an addition to the 2001 framework, this new agreement expands both powers' cooperation in counter-terrorism and border surveillance, allowing the Algerian military to allegedly intervene on Tunisian soil. While officially responding to the regional instability of the region from terrorist groups and human trafficking routes in the Sahel and Libya, this pact anchors Tunisia as an orbital country in Algeria’s security doctrine. The sheer imbalance in the two countries' military power leaves Tunis increasingly dependent on Algiers for strategic security.

While claiming sovereignty domestically, Kais Saied has made Tunisia dependent on a foreign power, sparking debate in Tunisia over the compromise of national sovereignty. Abdelmajid Tebboune responded to these critics, claiming that “The security of Tunisia is inseparable from the security of Algeria.”9

In reality, Algeria consolidates the regime by injecting short-term liquidity into the country, avoiding its economic collapse while strengthening its regional geopolitical presence by gaining a faithful ally in Saied’s person.

The European Union and Tunisia: Economic Dependence and Migration Issues

While Algeria provides liquidity, security and vocal political support, the European Union still remains Tunisia’s economic lifeline and, given Saied’s rhetoric, its most uncomfortable partner.

The EU remains Tunisia's main trading partner and source of foreign currency. Around €1.8 billion in diverse aid and funds has flowed directly into the Tunisian economy since 2011, representing around half of Tunisia’s total imports.10 Yet, since Saied’s authoritarian turn andthe restructuring of the migrant crisis, the relationship between the two belligerents has shifted from broadly transactional to migrational.

In July 2023, the EU and Tunisia signed a “Memorandum de bonne entente” offering financial aid to strengthen the Tunisian economy in exchange for migration control, among other aspects.11 Strongly backed by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, it aimed to reduce irregular migrant crossings into Europe while funding the country’s border controls and economic viability. Despite President Saied’s authoritarian consolidation of power and mounting reports of human rights abuses against sub-Saharan migrants, the partnership proceeded. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two parties remained highly volatile, shaped by persistent political uncertainty and diverging strategic priorities. In October 2023, Saied rejected around €42 million in EU aid, claiming Tunisia would not receive “charity” from Europe and denouncing it as “humiliating for the Tunisian people."12 These confrontations between Saied and Brussels remain very theatrical and serve more his domestic narrative of national sovereignty from foreign powers rather than an actual will to cut off from Europe’s funding. 

In reality, both are dependent on each other; Europe needs a stable regime to regulate migration, even if it is at the expense of democratic values and human rights. Kais Saied, despite his anti-Western doctrine, is dependent on European funding to keep his country’s economy afloat in the short term.

Russia and China: A Symbolic Leverage

In Saied’s rhetoric of distrust against the Western world, China and Russia serve less as strategic partners than as political counterweights.

Despite praising China’s development and geopolitical posture during his 2024 state visit to Beijing, and despite modestly expanding his energetic ties with Russia, neither country has managed to offer Tunisia credible economic alternatives to its traditional partners. The structural fragility of the Tunisian economy and its rising geopolitical marginalisation vis-à-vis other countries in the region, such as Algeria and Egypt, have led to low investment and limited trade volumes compared with the EU. China accounts for approximately 13% of Tunisia’s imports, compared with 43% for the European Union, while Russia accounts for roughly 7%.13 Although Beijing and Tunis have concluded cooperation agreements in sectors such as healthcare and technology, the scale of engagement remains insufficient to position China as a credible and reliable short-term partner for Tunisia as of 2025.

Despite claims of growing military proximity between President Saied and President Putin, notably advanced by the Italian outlet La Repubblica, such cooperation remains largely superficial. Structural constraints, most notably the Tunisian military’s longstanding institutional ties with the United States, sustained through annual military funding, as well as Tunisia’s increasing security and geopolitical reliance on Algeria, continue to limit any substantive realignment toward Moscow.14

Within this context, Russia and China primarily serve a political signalling function in Saied’s broader foreign policy strategy. By maintaining visible diplomatic engagement with both countries, Saied reinforces an “anti-Western” narrative domestically, presenting Moscow and Beijing as putative alternatives to the Western model. In practice, however, Tunisia’seconomic fragility and the limited material commitment from Russia and China have reinforced, rather than reduced, Saied’s short-term dependence on Europe and Algeria.

Tunisia and the IMF: The Limit to Sovereignty

Tunisia’s most consequential external relationship is defined by its absence: the failure to secure an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This impasse has effectively excluded Tunisia from international financial markets and deprived the country of access to a multi-billion-dollar stabilisation and reform package, with significant long-term implications for economic recovery and fiscal sustainability.

As previously noted, Tunisia’s economic performance has deteriorated significantly since President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power. As of 2025, unemployment stands at 15.7%, while inflation has reached approximately 6%.15 According to a World Bank report, the country’s persistent lack of long-term investment continues to constrain growth and heighten uncertainty about its economic outlook.16

In this context, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) functions not only as a potential lender but also as a key signal of credibility for accessing international financing and development assistance. President Saied, however, has consistently framed the IMF as a source of external coercion undermining national sovereignty.17 He has rejected the conditions attached to the proposed $1.9 billion loan package, particularly those related to political reforms and restructuring the national subsidy system, portraying them as incompatible with the national interest.18 Within this nationalist narrative, the IMF is cast less as a financial partner than as a political adversary—an “agent of the West” allegedly seeking to destabilise the country.

The rejection of IMF conditionalities has not been accompanied by the emergence of a viable alternative economic strategy. Neither liquidity support from Algeria and the European Union, nor prospective partnerships with China and Russia, have generated the sustained inflows necessary to strengthen Tunisia’s economy in the medium to long term. Instead, President Saied has become increasingly reliant on short-term and ad hoc financing arrangements.

The absence of a credible, long-term economic framework anchored in a recognised multilateral institution such as the IMF has also contributed to limited large-scale engagement from external partners. This dynamic is evident in the reluctance of European investors, illustrated by the €900 million loan package offered by Brussels in 2023, which was explicitly contingent on an IMF agreement, as well as in the muted involvement of Gulf hydrocarbon monarchies and the lack of substantive Sino-Russian investment initiatives. In this absence, an irony has emerged: a presidency built on the restoration of national sovereignty has instead produced heightened structural dependence on foreign powers.

Sources:

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