Sahelian Sovereigntists

Image source: https://www.aljazeera.com/video/inside-story/2024/7/7/whats-behind-the-creation-of-the-alliance-of-sahel-states

As the world shifts towards multipolarity, a young sovereigntist bloc in the Sahel is realigning West African geopolitics. Born from coups that occurred between 2020-2023, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which comprises Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has moved beyond mere military cooperation to become a central actor in the region’s new diplomatic and economic landscape. While the initial fervor that surrounded the coups has subsided, questions emerge about the alliance’s viability. This essay explores the causes of the initial coups and factors that will likely hinder the AES’s success moving forward; persistent jihadist threats, the precarious nature of its new international partnerships, and internal governance failures.

Historical Context of the Sahel

The Sahel is a vast arid belt, south of the Sahara, that stretches from Senegal to Sudan. The region faces structural vulnerabilities including resource scarcity, rapid population growth, and its past under French colonialism. One of the main drivers of instability in the last decade is the deteriorating security situation. After the fall of Gaddafi and subsequent collapse of Libya in 2011, there was an outflow of weapons into the Sahel.1 These weapons have empowered jihadist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and Islamic State, that continue to exploit weak state presence and long-unresolved local grievances as they compete between themselves.2

It is important to understand the underlying history of France's colonial power within the Sahel region, notably present antipathy towards the nation. France maintained significant economic control through the CFA franc, a currency pegged to the Euro and historically guaranteed by the French treasury,3 which is viewed by critics as a “powerful symbol” of ongoing French influence.4 Furthermore, France was the primary security guarantor in the region. French troops launched Operation Barkhane in 2014 forming a joint task force including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger but terrorist activity has increased significantly since then.5 The Sahel accounted for 43% of global terrorism deaths in 2022, amidst populations growing impatient with the inability of their governments to provide security.6 This has raised suspicion and anger among both political elites and the general public. For example, Malian officials have repeatedly alleged that French military operations have actually been drivers of terrorist activity, accusing France of protecting or tolerating some armed groups.5 These accusations frame French presence as motivated by strategic interests rather than genuine counterterrorism. to justify its prolonged military presence and protect strategic interests.

Francophone Spring: A String of Coups in the Sahel

Stemming from the deteriorating security and increasing suspicions, a series of coups occurred between 2020 and 2023. This coincided with many protests against France with some calling the unfolding events the “Francophone Spring”,6referring to a similar string of protests and coups in the Middle East and North Africa which occurred a decade prior. In Mali, Colonel Assimi Goita seized power in 2020 and again in 2021. The apparent catalyst for anti-French protests that eventually resulted in the 2021 coup was a French airstrike in January 2021 on a wedding party in Bounti. The French military claimed to have targeted jihadist fighters but a UN investigation found that at least nineteen civilians had been killed and concluded that the strike was in violation of international law.5 Burkina Faso’s Captain Ibrahim Traoré took charge in 2022, and Niger’s General Abdourahmane Tchiani ousted President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023.7 It can be argued that they shared the aforementioned common drivers: profound public disillusionment with civilian governments perceived as corrupt and incapable of addressing rampant insecurity, and a potent wave of anti-French sentiment. As one analyst notes, the roots lie in “the failures of governments to meet the needs of their people for development, security, and eradicating corruption”.8

Nevertheless, the coups have their individual nuances. For example, Niger’s coup could be explained as a power struggle between the democratically elected Mohammed Bazoum and the military leadership.6 The immediate aftermath of most of the coups saw massive public rallies, like those in Niger where protesters brandished Russian flags with signs reading “down with France, long live Putin”.7 The new junta leaders swiftly instrumentalized this anti-colonial narrative, framing their rule as a patriotic and sovereigntist project. Their first decisive acts targeted France abandoning French as a national language, terminating defense agreements, and expelling French troops and diplomats from all three countries.9 This marked a definitive end to the post-colonial security framework and created an immediate power vacuum.

The Geopolitical Consequences of the Resulting Power Vacuum

The expulsion of French forces had created a strategic vacuum that forced a realignment of regional geopolitics. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a regional body promoting economic cooperation, responded to Niger’s coup with an ultimatum, sanctions, and threats of military intervention. The coup leaders did not comply with the ultimatum and accused ECOWAS of acting as a “regional enforcer of external interests”.7 In January 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formalized their exit from ECOWAS. This split was ECOWAS’s most serious crisis since its establishment in 1975 and raised fears of instability spilling over into other states in the region.

At the same time, the Sahelian states pivoted towards alternative partners, with Russia emerging as the most prominent winner. Russia embraced and supported the military dictatorships, capitalizing off its existing security networks in the region to position itself favorably. Russian propaganda in the region has focused primarily around western failure in counter-terrorism2 as Russia works on building rapport with the young governments. The Wagner Group, now the Africa Corps, has been used to expand Russian influence by providing soldiers in exchange for access to resources.6 China is also increasingly present as an economic partner having ramped up their investment in the region following successful negotiations with the three states. These investments have faced setbacks though stemming from the deteriorating security situation.10

The Alliance of Sahel States

The Alliance of Sahel States shifted quickly from a reactive alliance against ECOWAS to a proactive confederation. In December 2025 the heads of the three member states met in Bamako, the capital of Mali, for the Confederal Summit of Heads of State of the AES. The leaders of the member states inaugurated the Sahel Investment and Development Bank to reduce reliance on western lenders, a new television channel, and a joint military force intended to operate across borders.4 However, serious concerns persist around the AES’s ability to deliver security and development. Russia’s security operations have been unable to entirely fill the vacuum left by the western exit from the region which militant groups have exploited.1 Armed conflict events have increased by over 400 percent under junta rule since 202011, and Jihadist groups like JNIM (an Al-Qaeda affiliate) have expanded their reach, blockading Bamako and launching attacks as far as the coast of Benin.4 Thus, while the AES might have successfully changed who their security guarantor is from France to Russia, they have not yet been able to solve the fundamental problem of insecurity.

What might the future hold?

The AES confederation faces converging pressures from both domestic and international sources. Despite framing their rule as a break from corrupt predecessors, the military governments have adopted increasingly restrictive governance practices. In Burkina Faso, critical journalists and civil society actors have been sent to the front line under Traore’s conscription policy while human rights groups who speak out against alleged extrajudicial killings claim to have been silenced. Likewise, in Mali, a government spokesperson told an Aljazeera journalist that he thought about putting journalists in jail “just for fun”.4 These authoritarian measures risk eroding the popular support that initially legitimized the coups. The coups empowered their people to believe in a future free of foreign intervention and corrupt leaders,9 but if they continue with their authoritarian actions, they might soon come to be perceived as the same tyrants they once opposed. Meanwhile, international actors have leveraged these governance concerns to apply economic pressure: Mali’s finance minister acknowledged that the IMF is withholding infrastructure loans until relations with France are improved.4 Whether the AES can navigate these dual pressures while maintaining cohesion remains an open question that will shape not only the Sahel's trajectory but will impact broader debates about sovereignty and international order in the Global South.

Conclusion

The AES represents a historic break from a post-colonial order that has long been a subject of criticism. The formation of this bloc, rooted in popular frustration and subtle power struggles, has expelled Western military presence and aligned with Russia, China, and other powers. However, the project stands at a precarious junction. Its foundational narrative of liberation is increasingly undermined by its own governance failures, a worsening security situation, and economic dependencies that persist despite the rhetoric of independence. The long term viability, and the stability of west africa, will depend on whether it can transition from a populist, anti-Western pact into a governance bloc capable of delivering genuine security, sustainable development, and accountable rule to its people. Otherwise, the Sahel will merely continue to switch tyrants without destroying tyranny.

Sources

1. Sky News. 2025. “Mapped: How Terrorists in West Africa Became so Powerful - and so Deadly.” YouTube. August 8, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4ZdYIX7PTY.

2. BBC World Service. 2025. “Is the Sahel the Most Dangerous Place on Earth? - BBC World Service.” YouTube. March 8, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-YVZwPlQugc.

3. Hayes, Adam. 2022. “CFA Franc: What It Means, How It Works, History.” Investopedia. September 20, 2022. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cfa-franc.asp.

4. Haque, Nicolas. 2025. “A Marriage of Three: Will Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso Bloc Reshape the Sahel?” Al Jazeera. December 31, 2025.  https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/12/31/a-marriage-of-three-will-mali-niger-burkina-faso-bloc-reshape-the-sahel.

5. Vaz, Ricardo. 2025. “The Sahel Seeks Sovereignty.” Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. August 12, 2025. https://thetricontinental.org/dossier-sahel-alliance-sovereignty/.

6. “What’s behind the Wave of Coups in Africa? | Start Here.” n.d. Www.youtube.com. Accessed November 15, 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=273KS2IfRZE.

7. Sky News. 2024. “Explained: The Dictators Reshaping West Africa.” YouTube. August 29, 2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqvOj6Ut9RU.

8. Mahmoud, Sohaib , and Mohamed Taifouri. 2023. “The Coups d’État of the Sahel Region: Domestic Causes and International Competition.” Arab Center Washington DC. September 18, 2023. https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/the-coups-detat-of-the-sahel-region-domestic-causes-and-international-competition/.

9. Human. 2025. “Military Coups in the Sahel: A Step Forward for Decolonization and a Step Backwards for Human Rights.” HRRC. July 18, 2025. https://www.humanrightsresearch.org/post/military-coups-in-the-sahel-a-step-forward-for-decolonization-and-a-step-backwards-for-human-rights.

10. Bociaga, Robert. 2025. “China’s Sahel Gamble Falters as Insurgencies Rage.” Thediplomat.com. The Diplomat. November 20, 2025. https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/chinas-sahel-gamble-falters-as-insurgencies-rage/.

11. Dr. Oluwole Ojewale. 2025. “The Sahel Coups and the Future of West African Democracy.” ICDI. December 23, 2025. https://dialogueinitiatives.org/the-sahel-coups-and-the-future-of-west-african-democracy/.