How China is Positioning Itself in Tanzania’s Growth

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Introduction and Background

Tanzania is a crucial member of the east African community. Located strategically by the Indian Ocean, Tanzania provides coastal access to markets and resources at the interior of Africa. With an enormous and young population Africa is undergoing significant economic growth while also experiencing notable political instabilities.

China is steadily strengthening relations with African countries. Tanzania is a strategic and economic giant in east Africa, and China has a longstanding relationship with Tanzania with deep economic and political integration. China’s relations with Tanzania is both important on its own, and also provides insights to the wider trend in African countries relations to China. China and Tanzania have a historical relationship dating back to Tanzanian independence, and most recently in 2022 elevated their relations to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” (sdfkjk). This article will explore the nature and trajectory of China’s relationship with Tanzania as the main focus, while it will also touch upon wider geopolitical competition in connection to Tanzania.

Infrastructure and Minerals

Tanzania is at an economic crossroads. With high ambitions for economic growth, as the government’s Vision 2050 aims for sustained 10% gdp annual growth, there is a pressing need for investment in various areas, infrastructure in particular (kj). One estimate suggests that after consistent growth around 6% in the last decade, Tanzania will need 63 billion USD in infrastructure investment by 2030 in areas such as roads, rails, ports, and 5G, to maintain the desired growth(sdfk). Therefore, financing sourced from beyond Tanzania's borders may be essential to attaining the development goals, and China presents itself as an important source of such investment.

Chinese infrastructure investments in Tanzania have a long history, beginning with the TAZARA railway, which stretches 1800 km from the Indian Ocean into Zambia (Konrad Adenauer). Tanzania is part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), from which projects such as the Julius Nyerere Hydropower Station, East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline, and more have stemmed. Just recently China, Tanzania and Zambia agreed on a project to revitalize the old TAZARA, calling it a “friendship railway” emphasizing the political and national nature of the project. The history of Chinese investment in infrastructure puts it as a preferred partner in this regard.

Tanzania is in large need of ports specifically, and in that area China’s both crucial and controversial role is clearly illustrated. China is currently engaged in various coastal projects in Tanzania such as the construction of the Kilwa fishing port and facilitating improvements to the crucial Dar Es Salaam port (sdkfj, sdkfjs). The Kilwa fishing port will be Tanzania’s first modern large scale fishing harbour and is expected to handle 60,000 tons of fish annually, and the construction is said to already have contributed to almost 600 direct jobs (sdkj).

However the previous flagship project of BRI in Tanzania, the 10 billion USD Bagamoyo port was suspended when China was accused of “exploitative terms” by the Tanzanian President John Magufuli (sldkfj). Magufuli said “only a drunkard would accept these terms” which included a 99 year lease on the port for the Chinese (sdlkfj) The project became another example used to argue for the Chinese “debt trap” in Africa and actually worsened relations  (sldkfj). The weariness towards loan conditions have been Now the project is to continue Africa Global Logistics leading construction, a European MSC subsidiary (sdlkfjsd).

These investments when successful do not only gain favor from the Tanzanian government, but they also open the interior of Africa to the Indian Ocean. This is crucial to China as it gives an advantage in the global race for critical minerals (skdjf). While the US connects Africa’s western coast to mineral rich south DRC and Zambia through Angola, China is doing so from the east through the TAZARA (sdlfkj). Tanzania is crucial to this end, considering the relative stability of Tanzania and the geographic location that connects Zambia, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, parts of Kenya, and eastern DRC to the Indian Ocean. International desire for minerals and market access is reflected in Tanzania’s domestic policies, with Special Economic Zones (SEZ) almost solely either by the coast or by mineral rich areas. For example, the establishment of the Buzwagi SEZ covering the Buzwagi gold mine, or the Bagamoyo SEZ covering the new port (sdfj). China is investing into the ownership of mines, for example Shenghe buying 100% of the Ngualla NdPr mine, producing a crucial rare earth mineral for electric vehicles, thus “undercutting western diversification plans” (sdfkj).

Therefore despite controversies surrounding unfair borrowing conditions, China is rapidly moving ahead to be an active investor in Tanzania. This is providing advantages in the active race for minerals, as well as helping position Tanzania as an ally in the east of Africa.

Political Support

The all-weather political support is a unique aspect of the relationship between China and Tanzania that cannot be overlooked. China is actively looking for politically friendly nations around the world, at which point Tanzania can be a source of strong support. However, most importantly China’s support for Tanzania despite democratic backsliding and human rights abuses is extremely valuable as a source of stability amid an ideological shift away from western democratic across east Africa.

This was on display after the protests following the highly controversial 2025 elections in Tanzania. After the election results released on October 30th were revealed to show sitting president Samia Suluhu Hassan winning an unbelievable 98% of the vote, large numbers of protesters took to the streets. As protests escalated, the government imposed a curfew, an internet shutdown, and eventually spiralled into a violent crackdown of which some human rights groups estimate as many as 3000 were killed by government forces (sdfkj). Reports of the violence, which included cases of door to door killing, what some consider a “state engineered massacre” shocked governments worldwide and strained the legitimacy of the Tanzanian government and relations with a huge number of countries.

While many western countries condemned the results of the election and the killings, China held on to a stance of so-called non interference. The EU immediately issued a resolution to face both the concerns of human rights abuses, and the overall trend of democratic backsliding, with the imprisonment of key political opponent, opposition leader Tundu Lissu, being at the forefront (sldkfj). The US followed similar action and conducted a review of the bilateral relations with the Tanzanian government (sdlkfj). China on the other hand did not condemn the events. In early January 2026, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi paid his first diplomatic visit of the year to Tanzania, celebrating their future partnership on economic and social grounds, and avoided mentioning the political violence completely, even congratulating the “successful conduct of the elections” (sdlkfj). Furthermore Wang Yi expressed China’s opposition to “any external force interfering in Tanzania’s internal affairs” (sdlkfj). This shows how despite democratic backsliding and abuse by the Tanzanian central government, they still have a reliable partner in trade, strategy, and development. Thus China’s support of Tanzania can be seen as an enabler of democratic backsliding, insulating Tanzania from other pressures, highlighting a significant issue in regards to China’s influence on not only Tanzania, but on all countries, and African countries in particular.

Competitive Geopolitical Environment

China is not alone in trying to influence Tanzania. While China’s positioning itself at the forefront through economic integration, India, gulf states and the EU are important players as well. These different actors have the ability to compete with China for influence in Tanzania. It is important to note that Tanzania recently revealed their revised National Foreign Policy in 2025, which focused on south-to-south cooperation, in particular with Asian countries  (sdfkjk).

Thus firstly we must look at Tanzania’s agency in this, which we will view through two major initiatives from the Tanzanian government, Development Vision 2050 and the National Foreign Policy. Firstly, Vision 2050 has three pillars, firstly economic growth, secondly human and social development, and thirdly environmental protection and resilience (sdlkfj). Economically Tanzania aims to reduce dependency on foreign aid, attract foreign investment and increase exports (sdfdsa). The National Foreign Policy outlines a strategy of Asian focus, primarily with regards to China and India (sdfkjk).

India’s historic ties to Tanzania dates back to the early 19th century. Currently bilateral trade amounts to 8.6 billion USD, while India is currently also Tanzania’s largest export market at 3.93 billion USD (sdlfkj)

While relations are moving towards China’s favor, Tanzania remains committed to a non-aligned foreign policy. A personal conversation with Tanzania’s ambassador to Sweden revealed how Tanzania continues to search for partners from all places in order to fuel their development.

Conclusion

Tanzania’s importance should not be overlooked. With a growing population and strategic location it is a key to east Africa. While Tanzania maintains a non-aligned foreign policy, China is steadily placing itself in a strong position. This will lead to economic benefit towards Tanzania through investments, the benefit towards China by access to minerals from the African interior and a competitive advantage in east Africa compared to western countries’ presence. Simultaneously, China’s ability to overlook human rights abuses poses questions about what domestic political side effects that China’s unconditional support may have.

Western countries are still engaged in Tanzania through investment projects, but have rapidly declining relations with Tanzania since the October election. The movement away from western democratic values may also be an indicator of a greater shift in influence towards China and away from the west.